Auto Topic: mci
auto_mci | topic
Coverage Score
1
Mentioned Chunks
3
Mentioned Docs
1
Required Dimensions
definitionpros_cons
Covered Dimensions
definitionpros_cons
Keywords
mci
Relations
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Evidence Chunks
| Source | Confidence | Mentions | Snippet |
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textbook Artificial-Intelligence-A-Modern-Approach-4th-Edition.pdf | 0.59 | 3 | ... ue that i would add (or remove), should i join the coalition C. Formally, the marginal contribution that player i makes to C is denoted by mci(C): mci(C) = ν(C∪{i})− ν(C). Now, a first attempt to define a payoff division scheme in line with Shapley’s suggestion that players should ... |
textbook Artificial-Intelligence-A-Modern-Approach-4th-Edition.pdf | 0.59 | 3 | ... i in the ordering p. Then the Shapley value for a game G is the imputation φ(G) = (φ1(G),...,φ n(G)) defined as follows: φi(G) = 1 n! ∑ p∈P mci(pi). (17.1) This should convince you that the Shapley value is a reasonable proposal. But the remark- able fact is that it is the unique ... |
textbook Artificial-Intelligence-A-Modern-Approach-4th-Edition.pdf | 0.55 | 1 | ... ill say that two players i and j are symmetric players Symmetric players if they always make identical contributions to coalitions—that is, mci(C) = mc j(C) for all C⊆ N−{ i, j}. Finally, where G = (N, ν) and G′ = (N, ν′) are games with the same set of players, the game G + G′ is ... |