Auto Topic: dominant
auto_dominant | topic
Coverage Score
1
Mentioned Chunks
29
Mentioned Docs
1
Required Dimensions
definitionpros_cons
Covered Dimensions
definitionpros_cons
Keywords
dominant
Relations
| Source | Type | Target | W |
|---|---|---|---|
| Auto Topic: dominant | CO_OCCURS | Utility Theory | 7 |
| Auto Topic: dominant | CO_OCCURS | Inference | 3 |
| Auto Topic: dominant | CO_OCCURS | Propositional Logic | 3 |
Evidence Chunks
| Source | Confidence | Mentions | Snippet |
|---|---|---|---|
textbook Artificial-Intelligence-A-Modern-Approach-4th-Edition.pdf | 0.67 | 8 | ational—or at least not wishing to be thought irrational—Ali chooses the dominant strategy. It is not hard to see that Bo’s reasoning will be identical: he will also conclude thattestify is a dominant strategy for him, and will choose to play it. The solution of the game, accordi ... |
textbook Artificial-Intelligence-A-Modern-Approach-4th-Edition.pdf | 0.65 | 6 | ... also better in that case. • So no matter what Bo chooses to do, it would be better for me to testify. Ali has discovered that testify is a dominant strategy for the game. We say that a strategy Dominant strategy s for player p strongly dominates strategy s′ if the outcome for s ... |
textbook Artificial-Intelligence-A-Modern-Approach-4th-Edition.pdf | 0.65 | 6 | ... ny player to deviate. However, Nash equilibria arelocal stable points: as we will see, a game may contain multiple Nash equilibria. Since a dominant strategy is a best response to all counterpart strategies, it follows that any dominant strategy equilibrium must also be a Nash eq ... |
textbook Artificial-Intelligence-A-Modern-Approach-4th-Edition.pdf | 0.61 | 4 | ... fairness. But that would mean they have different utility functions, and again, they would be playing a different game. The presence of a dominant strategy for a particular player greatly simplifies the decision making process for that player. Once Ali has realized that testifyin ... |
textbook Artificial-Intelligence-A-Modern-Approach-4th-Edition.pdf | 0.61 | 4 | ... search or computation on the part of the bidders, they may decide to take their money elsewhere. So it is desirable that the bidders have a dominant strategy. Recall that “dominant” means that the strategy works against all other strategies, which in turn means that an agent can ... |
textbook Artificial-Intelligence-A-Modern-Approach-4th-Edition.pdf | 0.59 | 3 | ... ll do, because she knows that no matter what Bo does , testifying would be her best response. However, mostBest response games have neither dominant strategies nor dominant strategy equilibria. It is rare that a single strategy is the best response to all possible counterpart str ... |
textbook Artificial-Intelligence-A-Modern-Approach-4th-Edition.pdf | 0.57 | 2 | ... i:heads Ali:tails Bo:heads A = 1,B =−1 A =−1,B = 1 Bo:tails A =−1,B = 1 A = 1,B =−1 We invite the reader to check that the game contains no dominant strategies, and that no outcome is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies: in every outcome, one player regrets their choice, and wo ... |
textbook Artificial-Intelligence-A-Modern-Approach-4th-Edition.pdf | 0.57 | 2 | ... profile, and check whether any player has a beneficial deviation from that profile; if not, then it is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Dominant strategies and dominant strategy equilibria can be computed by similar algorithms. Unfortunately, the number of possible strategy p ... |
textbook Artificial-Intelligence-A-Modern-Approach-4th-Edition.pdf | 0.57 | 2 | ... s simple modification completely eliminates the complex deliberations required for standard (orfirst-price) sealed- bid auctions, because the dominant strategy is now simply to bid vi; the mechanism is truth- revealing. Note that the utility of agent i in terms of his bid bi, his v ... |
textbook Artificial-Intelligence-A-Modern-Approach-4th-Edition.pdf | 0.57 | 2 | ... r logic,274 in knowledge representation, 283 domain closure, 282, 643 domain randomization, 967 dominance stochastic, 531, 547 strict, 530 dominant strategy, 597, 625 dominant strategy equilibrium, 597 dominated plan (in POMDP), 582 domination (of heuristics), 117 Domingos, P., 5 ... |
textbook Artificial-Intelligence-A-Modern-Approach-4th-Edition.pdf | 0.55 | 1 | ... McCarthy made two important contributions to AI. In MIT AI Lab Memo No. 1, he defined the high-level language Lisp, which was to become the dominant AI pro- Lisp gramming language for the next 30 years. In a paper entitled Programs with Common Sense, he advanced a conceptual prop ... |
textbook Artificial-Intelligence-A-Modern-Approach-4th-Edition.pdf | 0.55 | 1 | ... give both players just one year in prison, which would be better for both of them than the 5 years that each would serve if they chose the dominant strategy equilibrium. Is there any way for Ali and Bo to arrive at the (refuse,refuse) outcome? It is certainly an allowable option ... |
textbook Artificial-Intelligence-A-Modern-Approach-4th-Edition.pdf | 0.55 | 1 | ... :heads Ali:tails Bo:heads A = 1,B =−1 A =−1,B = 1 Bo:tails A =−1,B = 1 A = 1,B =−1 We invite the reader to check that the game contains no dominant strategies, and that no outcome is a Nash |
textbook Artificial-Intelligence-A-Modern-Approach-4th-Edition.pdf | 0.55 | 1 | ... ng these concepts to the prisoner’s dilemma game, introduced above, explains why it is called a dilemma. Recall that (testify,testify) is a dominant strategy equilibrium, and the only Nash equilibrium. However, this is the only outcome that is not Pareto optimal. The outcome (ref ... |
textbook Artificial-Intelligence-A-Modern-Approach-4th-Edition.pdf | 0.55 | 1 | ... they are in effect playing a single prisoner’s dilemma game. As we saw above, the outcome of the 100th round will be (testify,testify), the dominant equilibrium strategy for both players. But once the 100th round is determined, the 99th round can have no effect on subsequent roun ... |
textbook Artificial-Intelligence-A-Modern-Approach-4th-Edition.pdf | 0.55 | 1 | ... search or computation on the part of the bidders, they may decide to take their money elsewhere. So it is desirable that the bidders have a dominant strategy. Recall that |
textbook Artificial-Intelligence-A-Modern-Approach-4th-Edition.pdf | 0.55 | 1 | ... ods at a price ofbo +d, where bo is the highest bid among all the other agents and d is the auctioneer’s increment. 4 Bidders have a simple dominant strategy: keep bidding as long as the current cost is below your vi. The mechanism is not quite truth-revealing, because the winnin ... |
textbook Artificial-Intelligence-A-Modern-Approach-4th-Edition.pdf | 0.55 | 1 | ... communicates it to the auctioneer, without theSealed-bid auction other bidders seeing it. With this mechanism, there is no longer a simple dominant strategy. If your value is vi and you believe that the maximum of all the other agents’ bids will be bo, then you should bid bo +ϵ, ... |